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EGYPTIAN CONFIDENTIAL:  
AN ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE EGYPTIAN ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
By 
Kayla B. Snowberger* 
I.           INTRODUCTION 
Confidentiality in Arbitration: The Case of Egypt, by Mariam M. El-Awa,1 
addresses two of the most popular reasons why arbitration can be preferable to traditional 
litigation: privacy and confidentiality. Through her research, El-Awa2 intends to analyze 
the importance of confidentiality in the Egyptian arbitration system and the duty to 
maintain confidentiality during arbitral proceedings. El-Awa seeks to locate the source of 
the duty and determine whether the duty derives from law or custom.  
El-Awa explains that since the current literature on confidentiality shows a lack of 
consensus among scholars,3 and the topic has not “received much attention in Arabic 
jurisprudence,” she conducted interviews with various legal professionals, seeking their 
thoughts and opinions about several arbitration-related topics.4 El-Awa disperses 
comments from these interviews throughout the book, which consists of four relatively 
long chapters.  
Though each chapter is approximately fifty pages long, El-Awa breaks the topics 
into smaller subsections. Each chapter begins with an abstract, as well as an introductory 
section to prime the reader. Additionally, each chapter has a “Conclusion” section. In a few 
paragraphs, El-Awa summarizes the content of each chapter, helping to reiterate the main 
points. Readers may find the conclusions of the second, third, and final chapter of the book 
to be especially helpful for review of the material because these conclusions include a 
succinct summation of the materials within each chapter. This Article will address each of 
the four chapters, including El-Awa’s conclusions, and will conclude with a more 
comprehensive critique of the book. Overall, El-Awa’s book provides thoughtful, well-
researched commentary about her home country’s arbitration system. However, some parts 
of the book could have been better organized to facilitate reader understanding. For 
                                                 
* Kayla B. Snowberger is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 MARIAM M. EL-AWA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN ARBITRATION: THE CASE OF EGYPT (2016). Mariam El-Awa is 
an architect and attorney; she currently practices law in Cairo, Egypt. El-Awa earned her Ph.D. from King’s 
College London in Arbitration. El-Awa has legal experience in arbitration, contract law, and construction 
law and has published various works, in both English and Arabic, on a variety of topics related to arbitration. 
See Confidentiality in Arbitration, SPRINGER,  
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319391212#aboutAuthors (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
2 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at vii.  
3 Id. at 3. 
4 Id. at 40. 
example, a significant portion of each chapter is devoted to background information 
unrelated to confidentiality, El-Awa’s main focus. For those interested in learning about 
foreign legal processes, though, this book would provide a useful introduction to arbitration 
in Egypt.  
II.     CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND BASIC TERMINOLOGY  
El-Awa begins the book by addressing the scope of her research and giving the 
reader background information. Throughout the course of the book, El-Awa seeks to 
answer three substantive questions. First, El-Awa considers whether Egyptian arbitration 
law requires that arbitration be private and confidential and, if so, which “arbitration 
elements” are subject to the duty.5 Second, El-Awa seeks to determine whether the strong 
link between arbitration and the judiciary negates an assumption of confidentiality and 
privacy.6 Finally, if there is no codified law on confidentiality, El-Awa’s goal is to 
determine the legal basis for concluding arbitration is private and confidential.7 In this 
introductory chapter, El-Awa also acknowledges the limitations of her research.8 
A. Overview of the Egyptian Legal System 
After presenting her objectives, El-Awa introduces readers to Egypt’s legal system 
in a broad overview. This is a valuable part of the introductory chapter since some readers 
may be unfamiliar with Egyptian law. The Egyptian legal system is hierarchical, and El-
Awa describes it as follows: “[T]he more the will of the people is reflected in the drafting 
and legislative process the higher the status of the legislative document.”9 Thus, the 
Constitution10 occupies the top of the hierarchy and is followed by the laws and codes, 
which are the primary source of legal rules, and executive by-laws and ordinances.11  
                                                 
5 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 3. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 4 (explaining that this book does not address any contractual duty of confidentiality. Additionally, El-
Awa does not address confidentiality in investment arbitration. According to El-Awa, investment arbitration 
differs from commercial arbitration in terms of “. . . nature, origin, objectives, and the prevailing rules and 
principles. . . .” and would have negatively affected the scope of her research).  
9 Id. at 5.  
10 See Constitutional History of Egypt, CONSTITUTIONNET, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-egypt (last visited May 17, 2017) (explaining 
that in times of political unrest or turmoil, which are unfortunately frequent, the Egyptian constitution has 
been suspended. In the past five years alone, Egypt has been governed by three different constitutions). 
11 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 5. 
El-Awa then introduces readers to arbitration in Egypt and provides a brief 
historical summary.12 This summary is helpful because it illustrates the evolution of 
Egyptian arbitration law. The first Egyptian arbitration laws were codified in 1883 as part 
of the Ottoman Decree of 13/11/1883,13 in which an entire chapter was devoted to 
arbitration.14 Legislators did not codify any other arbitration laws until Law. No. 77 in 
1949.15 During this time, arbitration was heavily disfavored; many legal scholars of the 
period expressed skepticism of arbitration.16 In 1957, Mohamed Al-Ashmawy expressed 
that arbitration was a “risky system” that “deviat[ed] from the right path . . .”17 Though 
arbitration was sometimes still used, the generally unfavorable treatment of arbitration 
persisted for several decades. Even today, some  Egyptians are uneasy about the Western 
influence on arbitration.18 However, legislators became increasingly aware of the need for 
a more “arbitration-friendly environment” because arbitration would provide a more 
private, efficient forum for dispute resolution among foreign investors.19  
In 1994, Egypt adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law), which includes 
provisions about arbitration, and amended its provisions to suit the needs of the country.20 
Unlike the Model Law in its original form, Egypt’s version, the Law on Arbitration in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (also referred to as the “New Law”) applies to both international 
                                                 
12 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 6. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 7 (iterating that these codified arbitration laws were also the very first of their kind among the Arab 
nations); see also Mark S. W. Hoyle, The Mixed Courts of Egypt: An Anniversary Assessment, 1 ARAB L. Q. 
60, 66-67 (1985) (discussing the 1883 Commercial Code and commenting that the practice of arbitration 
continues, though procedures have changed since 1883).  
15 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 7.  
16 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68 (2d. ed. 2014) (commenting that 
judicial hostility towards arbitration has often been “cyclical” and wanes in light of superseding business 
interests). 
17 MOHAMED AL-ASHMAWY, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROCEDURE IN EGYPTIAN LEGISLATION 290 (1957); 
see also EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 7 n.22 (commenting that Al-Ashmawy, who passed away in 1967, was a 
professor at Cairo University, an appellate judge, and a member of the drafting committee for the Civil 
Procedural Code of 1949. Al-Ashmawy is still highly respected in Egypt and is considered the father of 
Egyptian procedural law). 
18 See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND 
PRACTICE 8-9 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) (commenting that some scholars still dislike the “Americanization” 
of arbitration, particularly in reference to “aggressive litigation tactics” and costly discovery practices in 
international arbitration. However, the United States has also been influenced by global standards by 
requiring arbitrators to be independent even if they are appointed by one of the parties to the arbitration). 
19 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 8. 
20 Id. at 10. 
and domestic arbitrations and also includes an express provision regarding a duty of 
confidentiality in arbitral proceedings.21  
B. Confidentiality And Privacy in Arbitration, Generally 
The distinction between the concepts of “confidentiality” and “privacy” is rather 
recent in the context of arbitration law; previously, the terms were used interchangeably.22 
El-Awa defines each separately, since she addresses both frequently during the course of 
her book. El-Awa defines privacy as the exclusion of third parties from attending arbitral 
hearings.23 Privacy applies only to the arbitral hearing, rather than all stages of arbitration.24 
Conversely, confidentiality applies to all stages of the arbitral process and is defined as 
“access to arbitration information and documents [] limited to a number of persons who 
need to access it for the purpose of the arbitration.”25 El-Awa stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between the two concepts and defines the five elements of confidentiality 
and privacy as legal duties. The elements are: 1) who has the duty;26 2) what items are 
covered by the duty;27 3) how long the duty lasts;28 4) any exceptions to the duty;29 and 5) 
consequences for breaching the duty.30 
                                                 
21 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 10 (mentioning that no preceding Egyptian arbitration law had ever addressed a 
duty of confidentiality. Additionally, there had never been a requirement that arbitral hearings be private); 
see also Marshall J. Berger & Shelby R. Quast, International Commercial Arbitration: A Case Study of the 
Areas Under Control of the Palestinian Authority, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 185, 207-08 (2000) (reiterating 
that the New Law applies in domestic and international arbitration and noting that Egypt has experienced an 
increase in foreign investment since the adoption of the New Law). 
22 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that “[I]n light of recent scholarly interpretations, in the context of 
arbitration hearings, the term confidentiality should not be used to denote privacy. The term private or 
privacy, as opposed to publicity in court hearings, is more accurate and in conformity with the international 
terminology on this issue.”); see also HAMZA HADDAD, ARBITRATION IN ARABIC LAWS 300 (2008) (stating 
that “Confidentiality means that arbitral hearings are exclusive to the arbitral tribunal and the parties . . . any 
other persons cannot attend without the parties’ consent and the tribunal’s as well.”). 
23 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 14. 
24 Id. at 15.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 17 (iterating that the duty can apply to anyone involved in the arbitration process).  
27 Id. (explaining that documents and deliberations are examples of items covered by the obligation).  
28 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 17 (commenting that the obligation begins as soon as the arbitral process starts 
and ends after the final award has been determined).  
29 Id. at 18 (providing an example of an exception: public policy).  
30 Id. (commenting that among the legal community, a debate has been ongoing in regards to the 
consequences for a breach of the duty of confidentiality. The question remains as to whether breach taints 
El-Awa ends the substantive material of this chapter by engaging in a brief 
comparative overview of the duty of confidentiality across various jurisdictions.31 Some 
countries, including Australia, Sweden, and the United States, have rejected the notion of 
requiring a duty of confidentiality as a matter of law.32 Switzerland has not yet addressed 
privacy or confidentiality on any legal basis.33 England recognizes confidentiality,34 and 
France’s long-held tradition of confidentiality in arbitration was officially codified in 
2011.35 New Zealand also recognizes a duty and extensively covers confidentiality in the 
New Zealand Arbitration Act.36  
El-Awa briefly discusses confidentiality in Arab nations. In the Arab region 
(encompassing Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and several other countries) there is a belief that 
arbitration must be confidential.37 However, pinpointing a legal basis for that belief has 
proven difficult.38 Though this particular section was informative and helpful, its placement 
towards the end of the chapter interrupted the topical flow of the chapter and caused an 
awkward shift away from the focal point: Egyptian law. 
To conclude this chapter, El-Awa provides a brief outline of each of the three 
subsequent chapters in the book.39 El-Awa also explains her methodology and how she 
gathered the research for this book.40 El-Awa looked to legislation and court cases, as well 
                                                 
the award, resulting in the need for vacatur of the award, or if imposing a civil liability on the breaching party 
is sufficient. El-Awa revisits this topic later in the book). 
31 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 18.  
32 Id. at 19. See also International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.); The Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 
1999:116); Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 16; Laura A. Kaster, Confidentiality in U.S. 
Arbitration, 5 N.Y. DISP. RES. LAW. 23, 25 (2012) (explaining that, though the Federal Arbitration Act is 
largely silent about the topic of confidentiality, four states (Arkansas, Missouri, California, and Texas) have 
statutory protections for arbitration communications. Some other states also have statutory provisions that 
impose a duty of confidentiality in specific types of arbitration cases). 
33 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 29; see also Private International Law Act (c. 12/1987) (Switz.). 
34 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 24; see also Arbitration Act 1996 (c. 23/1996) (Eng.). 
35 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 27; see also CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 
1464 (Fr.) (iterating that “Subject to legal proceedings, and unless otherwise agreed by the parties, arbitral 
proceedings shall be confidential.”). 
36 EL- AWA, supra note 1, at 28; see also Arbitration Act 1996 (Act No. 99/1996) (N.Z.). 
37 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 35. 
38 Id. at 35-36. 
39 See id. at 39-40.  
40 Id. at 38. 
as literature on her topic.41 This topic has not often been addressed in Arabic jurisprudence, 
so El-Awa opted to conduct interviews with professionals to supplement the research.42  
El-Awa interviewed judges, law professors, arbitrators, and administrators 
involved in various stages of the arbitral process.43 El-Awa chose from three sets of 
questions depending upon her interviewee; the Appendix contains these questions.44 The 
first set of questions involved definitions of confidentiality and privacy in arbitration. Only 
judges received the second set of questions, which involved procedural questions. The third 
set of questions, given only to arbitrators, included arbitration-specific questions.45 El-Awa 
is very thorough in her description of her methodology, and the outline at the end of the 
chapter primes the reader for the material that is addressed in the subsequent chapters.  
III. CHAPTER TWO: PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN EGYPTIAN ARBITRATION 
In the second chapter of the book, El-Awa addresses her research questions and 
revisits the difference between confidentiality and privacy, as discussed briefly in the first 
chapter. First, El-Awa guides the reader through an overview of privacy in Egyptian 
arbitration.46 Second, El-Awa analyzes privacy and confidentiality as separate obligations 
in arbitration.47 Finally, El-Awa discusses confidentiality in Egyptian arbitration through 
the lens of specific arbitration laws and also incorporates the opinions of practitioners in 
the Egyptian arbitration community.48  
 
 
A. Privacy in Egyptian Arbitration 
 
To begin, El-Awa addresses the opinions of arbitration scholars and her 
interviewees regarding confidentiality and privacy, particularly Gary Born.49 Born’s 
definition of “privacy” is similar to El-Awa’s definition from the first chapter: privacy 
                                                 
41 Id. at 40. 
42 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 40. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 201. 
45 Id. at 40. 
46 Id. at 48. 
47 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 58. 
48 Id. at 63. 
49 See Gary Born, WILMERHALE, https://www.wilmerhale.com/gary_born/ (last visited May 17, 2017) 
(providing an overview of Born’s publications and work experience); see also GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2251-52 (2009). 
protects arbitrating parties from third-party interference.50 Born defines “confidentiality” 
as an obligation not to disclose information relating to the arbitration proceeding to third 
parties and the prohibition of third-party attendance to arbitral hearings.51 Noting the 
overlap in these definitions, El-Awa decides to consider the obligation to exclude third 
parties from the hearings as an obligation related to privacy, rather than confidentiality.52 
However, El-Awa does not elaborate as to why she believes this particular obligation is 
one of privacy and leaves readers wondering about her rationale.  
Next, the chapter proceeds with El-Awa’s analysis of privacy and confidentiality 
as separate obligations.53 El-Awa discusses privacy in the law and in legal practice in 
Egypt. Egypt’s arbitration law is silent concerning the concept of privacy,54 but El-Awa 
argues privacy could be considered an integral part of arbitration by looking to custom.55 
El-Awa asked some of her interview subjects for their thoughts regarding privacy as a 
custom in arbitration. A “vast majority of [the] interviewees” felt privacy was, indeed, a 
custom in arbitration.56 Mohamed El-Awa commented, “This custom—absent provision or 
agreement—is the source of the rule of privacy in arbitration hearings.”57 Others disagreed. 
Professor El-Kosheri,58 an arbitrator, stated “the fact that a breach of privacy is not a valid 
ground to annul [an] award makes me hesitant to say it is a custom.”59  
                                                 
50 BORN, supra note 49, at 2251-52. 
51 Id. 
52 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 45. 
53 Id. at 44; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1211, 1211-12 (2006) (agreeing that privacy and confidentiality are distinct from one another. Schmitz 
argues that arbitration is private because it is a closed forum but is not confidential because information 
revealed during the course of the arbitration can become public. Schmitz further argues that because the 
terms “private” and “confidential” are so often confused, parties could potentially be misguided while 
contracting for arbitration). 
54 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 48.  
55 Id. at 49. 
56 Id. at 50. 
57 Id. at 49. 
58 See Ahmed El-Kosheri, Curriculum Vitae, KOSHERI, RASHED & RIAD, http://www.krr-law.com/assets/det-
ver-of-dr-ahmed-cv.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017) (detailing professional accomplishments of Professor 
Ahmed El-Kosheri, a practicing attorney and arbitrator who has authored more than 50 publications, in 
French and English, about international arbitration and various topics related to Egyptian law).  
59 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 50. 
Though the chapter mainly focuses on Egypt, El-Awa also briefly mentions privacy 
in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.60 El-Awa then poses a question to her interviewees 
regarding their belief about what consequences should stem from a breach in privacy.61 A 
majority of the interviewees believed a breach should result in civil liability, but a few 
advocated for vacatur of the arbitral award.62 El-Awa seems to agree with the majority that 
privacy is a custom in arbitration, but she mentions that she has no knowledge of any case 
wherein a breach of privacy, on its own, was sufficient grounds for the nullity of an 
award.63 This seems to suggest that this custom of privacy is not codified as a law. 
 
 
B. Confidentiality in Egyptian Arbitration 
 
El-Awa next investigates confidentiality in Egypt and begins by taking a closer look 
at the Arbitration Law of Egypt.64 El-Awa focuses on Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994.65 
Specifically, she examines Article 44/2, the only provision dealing directly with 
confidentiality.66 The text of the statute states: “[t]he arbitral award may not be published 
in whole or in part except with the approval of the parties.”67 The arbitral award is 
specifically addressed in the statute to thwart any potential confusion among those who 
may not be familiar with arbitration and might confuse arbitration with judicial 
proceedings. Traditional court judgments are published, but arbitral awards cannot be 
published unless the arbitrating parties give consent.68   
                                                 
60 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 53-56. 
61 Id. at 57. 
62 Id. 
63 Id at 58; see also Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: Exploration of the Confidentiality in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 1014–17 (2001) (agreeing that the case 
law regarding breach of confidentiality in arbitrations is slim. Brown also discusses a few possible 
consequences from arbitrator breach, such as personal liability and termination of contract. El-Awa’s 
conclusion that breach of confidentiality, alone, is insufficient to nullify an arbitral award echoes Brown’s 
statement along the same lines. In Brown’s opinion, “any duty of confidentiality is meaningless if it can be 
violated without consequence.”). 
64 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 59. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 EGYPT - OFFICIAL GAZETTE, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE (Marci Hoffman ed.), 
http://dx.doi.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/10.1163/2213-2996_flg_COM_067406 (last visited May 17, 
2017); see also Egypt: Law No. 27 of 1994, 10 ARAB L. Q. 46 (2001) (containing a copy of the text of the 
arbitration law).  
68 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 63. 
Various scholars have discussed how far the duty of nonpublication extends.69 
Some advocate for a permissive interpretation of Article 44/2, arguing that the statute only 
prohibits the publication of “complete” arbitral awards, or awards that contain information 
with enough specificity to identify the parties.70 These scholars believe that the publishing 
of redacted versions of arbitral awards would not constitute a breach of confidentiality.71 
El-Awa seems to agree that publishing redacted awards is acceptable because she states 
that the “publication of redacted awards contributes to scholarly discussions on the various 
legal matters addressed in arbitration . . . [because] arbitration is the first means sought to 
resolve disputes as an attractive alternative to lengthy court proceedings.”72  
Though opinions differ regarding the publication of awards, there is a general 
consensus that deliberations between the arbitrators should be largely secretive.73 The 
Arbitration Law of Egypt is silent on the manner in which deliberations should be 
conducted, but El-Awa notes that arbitration is a specific civil procedure and thus infers 
that the Egyptian Civil Procedure Code, which applies to judges, can be used as a gap filler 
in arbitration laws regarding secrecy in deliberation.74 Here, El-Awa makes a logical 
inference. Judges have a duty to deliberate in secret, and this duty can also be applied to 
arbitrators due to the “judicial nature of arbitration.”75 Interestingly, despite these legal 
provisions, the most reported type of confidentiality breach is that of a breach during 
deliberations, where confidential information was disseminated outside of the 
deliberations.76 El-Awa mentions that at least six of her interviewees had personally 
witnessed a breach during deliberations.77 If El-Awa had elaborated on the interviewees’ 
                                                 
69 See Hans Smit, Breach of Confidentiality As A Ground for Avoidance of the Arbitration Agreement, 11 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 567, 568 (2000) (looking at confidentiality and nonpublication through the lens of 
some Swedish court decisions and comprehensively analyzing breaches of confidentiality). In one opinion 
from the Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden, A.I. Trade Finance Inc. v. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank (Svea 
App. 1999), reproduced in 14(4) Int'l Arb. Rep. at A-1 (1999), the court addressed publication of arbitral 
information and opined that assessment of the kind of information that was published was important. The 
court also looked to factors such as whether the reason for publication could be justified, the extent to 
which the other party would be damaged by publication, and whether the information was published solely 
to harm the other party. 
70 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 68-69. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 69.  
73 Id. at 72. 
74 Id. at 73. 
75 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 73. 
76 Id. at 78. 
77 Id. 
experiences, the reader may have found these personal accounts to be more illustrative of 
this kind of breach.  
El-Awa also discusses dissenting opinions, sometimes considered a form of breach, 
in this chapter.78 In a way, dissenting opinions could be said to be a breach of 
confidentiality because dissenting opinions often disclose details of the arbitral 
deliberations and show where arbitrators disagreed.79 Despite this, Egyptian law allows for 
dissenting opinions in arbitrations.80 Ultimately, El-Awa does not think that dissents can 
be considered a breach, but rather should be considered a limitation on the duty of 
confidentiality.81 The author does not further explain her rationale; more insight from El-
Awa may have made this brief discussion more meaningful to the reader.  
El-Awa concludes that, among the Egyptian arbitration community, a general duty 
of confidentiality does exist, though practitioners express differing opinions of what the 
duty entails. Based on her findings, El-Awa concludes that there are three “core” elements 
of confidentiality: 1) secrecy in deliberations; 2) privacy during arbitral hearings; and 3) 
confidentiality of the final award.82 Though El-Awa tried to separate confidentiality from 
privacy, she acknowledges that the two concepts are still largely intertwined.83 The reader 
may find that, despite El-Awa’s efforts to keep confidentiality and privacy separate, the 
discussions of each of those topics seem somewhat repetitive. 
 
IV. CHAPTER THREE: PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
While the second chapter examined Egyptian arbitration from a broader 
perspective, the third chapter discusses the Public Trial rule of Egypt,84 a judicial law, and 
its relevance in arbitration proceedings.85 Though El-Awa introduces the Public Trial rule 
                                                 
78 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 79. 
79 Id. at 86. 
80 Id. at 87; see also Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in Investment 
Arbitration, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 445, 450-54, 476 (2012) (explaining that dissenting opinions 
are strongly defended in the American arbitral system. Martinez-Fraga and Samra, attorneys at DLA Piper, 
discuss America’s rich history of dissenting opinions, address common criticisms of dissents and defend 
dissents. The authors also state that: “Dissents will play an important role in the continued development of 
international arbitration.”).  
81 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 87. 
82 Id. at 96. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 106 (quoting the Public Trial rule: “Court hearings are public, unless the court orders that they be 
held in secrecy subject to consideration of public order or morals.”).  
85 Id. at 97. 
on the first page of the chapter, she does not provide the text of the statute until nine pages 
later.86 The reader may have been provided with better context if El-Awa had quoted the 
statute when it was first mentioned. 
 El-Awa examines the Public Trial rule and the extent to which it is applied in the 
judicial system. She also hopes to answer the question of whether various parts of the 
arbitral process should be “subjected to the same level of publicity as their counterparts in 
the judicial system.”87 El-Awa argues that the rule of publicity cannot automatically extend 
to arbitrations.88  
El-Awa notes that there are key differences in the powers and functions of judges 
and arbitrators, though arbitrators and judges are frequently compared.89 El-Awa’s 
comparisons between arbitrators and judges will be especially helpful to those who are less 
familiar with arbitration. The roles of arbitrators and judges differ, as an arbitrator issues 
awards rather than legal decisions.90 Additionally, judges and arbitrators receive their 
authority from differing sources. A judge receives jurisdiction through the law, whereas 
the arbitrator is given jurisdiction through the agreement of the parties involved; in 
agreeing to arbitrate, the parties give the arbitrator authority to resolve the dispute and 
divest the court of its jurisdiction to hear the matter.91 These, however, are basic 
distinctions, according to El-Awa, so she is more interested in two specific differences 
between judges and arbitrators and explains them to readers.  
The first difference is the extent to which arbitrators must follow state court 
procedures. El-Awa iterates that academics generally believe that an arbitrator can adopt 
any procedure he or she deems appropriate if the parties do not specify one themselves.92 
Conversely, judges are bound by precedent and general rules regarding procedures.93 The 
second specific distinction between judges and arbitrators in Egypt is that arbitrators cannot 
                                                 
86 See EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 106. 
87 Id. at 99. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 102-03. 
90 Id. at 103; see also Egypt: Legal Framework for Arbitration, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/arbitration/egypt.php (last visited May 17, 2017) (providing general 
information regarding arbitration and the judicial process in Egypt). 
91 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 103.  
92 Id. at 104; see also James J. Sentner, Jr., Arbitrator Discretion: Should it be Restricted by Party 
Stipulation of Governing Procedural Rules?, 62 DISP. RES. J. 77, 78-79 (2007) (stating that “When no 
procedural rules are incorporated in the arbitration clause . . . the tribunal steps in to fill the gap . . . 
possibly with no limitations on their discretion or with their discretion limited only by the arbitration or 
procedural law of the seat of the arbitration.”). 
93 EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 103. 
compel witnesses or parties to testify during proceedings.94 An arbitrator or arbitral tribunal 
must seek assistance from the state court in order to compel a witness to testify on a 
particular matter.95 So, while arbitrators have considerable power, much of this power 
depends upon the cooperation of those involved with the arbitration. An arbitrator’s power 
is derived from “party autonomy,” not law.96 
Trial publicity promotes transparency in the administration of justice97 by allowing 
the public to scrutinize the way in which the judiciary makes decisions. Arbitrations are 
not subject to the same public scrutiny as trials.98  In contrast to public trials, where the 
same judge hears many cases, a different arbitrator or arbitral tribunal is appointed for each 
dispute submitted to arbitration.99 Further, an Egyptian arbitration is less adversarial than 
a trial; “amicable settlement and compromise are fundamental constituents of 
arbitration.”100  
Though the Public Trial principle seems largely inapplicable to arbitration, El-Awa 
analyzes the rule as a legal provision and looks for any particular procedures that may be 
relevant to arbitration proceedings.101 One procedure the author examines is document 
access.102 Members of the public seeking to review confidential case documents must 
submit a request to the presiding judge.103 In an arbitration proceeding, only the arbitrating 
parties have the authority to give third parties access to arbitration documents.104 
Administrative personnel in an arbitration, in comparison to court personnel, are more 
restricted in their access to documents.105 Because of the heightened restrictions to 
document access in arbitrations, El-Awa opines that the possibility of a breach of 
confidentiality is greater in a court than in an arbitration, despite the duty of confidentiality 
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in both.106 This conclusion seems logical because more people are involved in court 
proceedings,107 increasing the chance that someone may disseminate confidential 
information at any stage of the proceedings. 
Parties in court cases may not waive publication of court proceedings because 
publicity is “essential to confirm the image of justice in the public’s view.”108 El-Awa notes 
that summary judgment is the only exception to this rule on publicity.109 Summary 
judgment is not final and can be overturned during a trial if the case continues.110 El-Awa 
reiterates that this cannot apply to arbitral awards because awards are only published when 
both parties consent.111 Arbitration does not yield to any pressures from public opinion.112  
El-Awa ends this chapter with a discussion of her conclusions about the Public Trial 
rule. Because the Public Trial rule does not apply to arbitration, El-Awa believes the legal 
basis of a duty of privacy is still missing.113 The reader may be surprised by how quickly 
the author disposes of the Public Trial rule and may wonder why El-Awa devoted so much 
energy to pursuing the rule at all. As she approaches the end of the book, El-Awa returns 
to her first research question: “[I]s arbitration private and confidential, if so what is the 
legal basis for these duties?” El-Awa then attempts to answer this question in the fourth 
and final chapter.114 
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V.         CHAPTER FOUR: CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY IN THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
In the concluding chapter, El-Awa addresses the legal duties prescribed by the laws 
of Egypt.115 She categorizes these duties as either an application of constitutional principle 
or an exception.116 El-Awa seeks to determine which law or legal principle mandates that 
individuals maintain confidentiality in arbitration. Additionally, El-Awa discusses the right 
to privacy and the extent to which the Egyptian constitution recognizes and protects 
confidentiality.117 
A. The Right to Privacy: Civil Protection 
According to El-Awa, the right to privacy is “the entitlement of every person to 
have his private life protected from intrusion.”118 All persons, then, have an obligation not 
to interfere with the private life of others. The “private life” is the protected entity. Though 
scholars agree that private life is protected from third party interference, “private life” lacks 
a “universal exclusive definition.”119  
Interestingly, though privacy is valued by most citizens, “private life” was never 
mentioned in an Egyptian constitution until 1971 in Article 45.120 Afterward, the privacy 
of individuals was protected from not only individual interference, but from governmental 
interference as well.121 The Constitution of 2012 further expanded private protections by 
stating “the private life of citizens is inviolable, and its confidentiality is guaranteed.”122 
El-Awa voiced a strong preference for this version because the 2014 version currently in 
effect “quite unfortunate[ly]” redacted the specific mention of “confidentiality.”123 
Though the constitutional provision seeks to prevent invasions of individual 
privacy, the constitutional drafting committee was cognizant that intrusions would likely 
still occur and believed that providing compensation to those who have been wronged was 
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as important as guaranteeing the privacy right from the start.124 In order to protect 
individual rights, the drafters revised Article 80 of the 2012 Constitution to read: “Any 
assault on the rights and liberties warranted in the constitution is a crime, and the criminal 
or civil cases arising therefrom do not become a nonsuit by statute of limitation, and the 
State guarantees a fair compensation to the victim of such an assault.”125 The inclusion of 
both criminal and civil court actions further expanded the right of privacy in Egypt.126 El-
Awa notes that this provision, specifically guaranteeing compensation, was significantly 
progressive for a country like Egypt, well known for human rights violations throughout 
history.127 
In Egypt, citizens have “personality rights,” similar to “fundamental rights” in the 
United States.128 These rights are protected under Civil Code Article 50, which provides,  
“Any person subjected to unlawful assault on any of his personality rights is entitled to 
request the termination of this assault as well as compensation for any sustained 
damages.”129 El-Awa confronts the question of whether “private life” and a “right to 
privacy” would both be considered personality rights.130 Because inherent personality 
rights cannot be waived, this question is easily answered: “private life” is a personality 
right, but the “right to privacy” cannot be.131 El-Awa reasons that the right of privacy can 
be waived when an individual “legaliz[es] the intrusion” upon that right.132 An example of 
legalizing an intrusion would be an individual’s publishing of an autobiography, since that 
action would waive any claim of privacy to the information within. Though privacy is not 
a personality right, it is a “mechanism advanced to protect other material and moral rights, 
including that of private life.”133 Aspects of “private life” can include secrets or generally 
private matters.134 El-Awa opines that Article 50 could potentially be a basis for 
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confidentiality in arbitration because information exchanged during an arbitration is a 
“secret” between the parties involved.135 
B. Criminal Protection of Privacy 
Though privacy is well-protected under Egyptian civil law, Egyptian criminal law 
provides even more comprehensive protection of individuals’ privacy.136 Certain groups of 
individuals are specifically obligated by law to safeguard private information and can be 
sanctioned for disclosing this information without consent.137 Article 309 bis A of Penal 
Code no. 58 (1937) prescribes: “Whoever discloses, facilitates the disclosure of, or uses, 
even non-publicly, a recording or document . . . without the consent of the concerned party, 
shall be punished by imprisonment.”138 Public employees also have a duty to maintain 
privacy pursuant to evidence laws.139 These laws prohibit public employees from 
disclosing secrets they have encountered during the course of their employments.140  
Some of these laws have been created out of necessity because certain professions 
bring individuals into contact with many secrets and confidential issues. For example, 
lawyers, civil servants, and doctors encounter confidential information regularly.141 There 
is a strong public interest in making certain that these professionals appear to be, and are, 
trustworthy. These individuals provide valuable services, and people must feel able to 
confidently approach them with private needs and concerns. A lack of trust would 
compromise these relationships and positions.142 Disclosures which reveal a person’s 
identity (by containing information that is too specific) are also illegal.143   
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C. Exceptions to Privacy 
Some exceptions apply to the rule of nondisclosure, and these exceptions typically 
advance a public interest.144 For example, professionals may disclose information that 
pertains to the commission of a crime. Additionally, members of the public are encouraged 
to come forward when they become aware of information pertaining to the planning or 
commission of a crime, even if the information was disclosed in private.145 Attorneys have 
permission to disclose confidential or private information if defending themselves from 
accusations of wrongdoing.146  
The Egyptian Constitution also has granted individuals some rights that seem to 
conflict with an entitlement to privacy. El-Awa addresses three: 1) freedom of expression; 
2) freedom of the press; and 3) freedom of information.147 Freedom of expression allows 
individuals to iterate their own opinions, usually with few restrictions.148 Sometimes, this 
expression results in the disclosure of private information.149 The freedom of the press can 
conflict with privacy because the press can disseminate potentially private information to 
the public. El-Awa posits that there needs to be a balance achieved between private life 
and free press.150 The press does not have an unfettered ability to intrude upon private lives. 
A give-and-take relationship between private life and the press could provide respect for 
individual privacy and still allow the press to perform its main duty: informing the 
public.151  
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The private life of public figures, though somewhat protected from the press, is not 
immune from public scrutiny.152 The freedom of information entitles the public to be made 
aware when public figures (in their private capacity) are acting in contravention of public 
interest.153 So, though information exceptions do allow for some intrusions into private life, 
limitations still exist. Journalists do not have any more liberty to interfere with private life 
than the average citizen.154 El-Awa opines that confidentiality in arbitration comes from 
the overreaching right to privacy.155 This opinion is somewhat counterintuitive, since El-
Awa stressed that confidentiality and privacy are separate obligations. 
D. El-Awa’s Conclusion 
Finally, El-Awa addresses her research conclusions and summarizes her findings 
from each chapter of the book. She acknowledges that though the confidentiality of the 
proceedings seems to be taken for granted, little research examines confidentiality in 
arbitration, specifically.156 Additionally, there is no specific rule providing for 
confidentiality because the duty has no basis in any existing arbitration law.157 The lack of 
a law led to the second inquiry: analysis of the Public Trial rule.158 This resulted in the 
conclusion that the Public Trial rule simply does not apply in arbitration.159 El-Awa’s third 
inquiry led to the examination of individual rights as granted by the Egyptian legal 
system.160 Here, she found that the right to privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.”161 Because this right is broadly applied, El-Awa 
concludes that this is the “true basis for a legal duty of confidentiality in arbitration” and 
that it attaches to individuals and applies to any private information.162  
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Since confidentiality is a “corollary to the right of privacy,” it applies to private 
activities, generally, and thus can be extended to arbitration.163 El-Awa opines that the 
legislature could further define the duty of confidentiality by clarifying privacy laws but 
does not suggest that the legislature intends to do so.164 El-Awa views the targeting of 
privacy laws as a more attractive option than amending the federal laws because the 
selective clarification of specific laws means less state interference in arbitration, which is 
always an objective.165 Finally, El-Awa is hopeful that a balance between the 





VI.        CRITIQUE 
 
Overall, this book provides insightful commentary on Egyptian law and has several 
notable features. The Appendix section of the book was accessible and organized. The 
Appendix listed all of El-Awa’s interview questions and separated the questions according 
to the profession of the interviewee. The “List of Cases” section categorized court decisions 
by country, court level, and area of law. The Appendix also devotes a small section to 
arbitral awards and includes citations to all of the statutes and conventions that were 
mentioned or quoted throughout the book. A nine page Bibliography lists all books, 
articles, documents, and electronic resources that El-Awa discussed or cited throughout her 
book. 
 El-Awa’s research was thorough; however, some portions of the book had little or 
no application to arbitration and were more like summaries or explanations of Egyptian 
law, generally. This was especially true of the third chapter, as its main focus was the 
judiciary. Though El-Awa was exhaustive in explaining the judiciary and whether any 
judicial principles were applicable in arbitration, copious amounts of non-arbitration 
information caused the main focus (arbitration) to become almost secondary, at times. This 
made parts of the chapter seem disconnected from the book as a whole. 
Further, some of El-Awa’s sources were very difficult to verify. Some statutes the 
author cited were irretrievable using El-Awa’s footnotes or the citations in the Appendix. 
For example, the Public Trial rule remained elusive despite numerous attempts to locate 
the original text. Additionally, though El-Awa did mention in a footnote that some 
interviewees wished to remain anonymous, the lack of identifying information made it 
impossible to validate the information that these individuals contributed to the book. 
Because these interviews comprised a large portion of El-Awa’s research, more 
transparency would have made the interview comments more credible. While reading this 
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book, it was very helpful to look up biographical information for the interviewees who 
were identified to learn more about their areas of expertise and professional 
accomplishments. This could not be done for the interviewees who were not identified. 
Though the title emphasizes “Confidentiality,” some sections did not address 
confidentiality much at all. For example, privacy was an oft-addressed topic in this book, 
so much so that adding it to the title may give a more accurate depiction of what is discussed 
within the book. Through several parts of the book, El-Awa presented sizeable amounts of 
other information before addressing the titular topic. This may have been due to El-Awa’s 
organization of the information, but some sections, particularly towards the middle of the 
book, seemed fragmented. Additionally, some grammatical errors made a few sentences 
awkward, such as a missing nominative pronoun, a missing article, and some misspellings. 
None of those errors were serious enough to affect the clarity of the material, but they were 
noticeable. 
Moreover, material across the chapters overlapped, making some content seem 
repetitive. El-Awa acknowledged in the book’s Introduction that overlap could occur due 
to the novelty of her topic and the intersection of privacy and confidentiality. Discussions 
about privacy and confidentiality were notably prone to repetition. The third chapter, 
discussing the differing roles of judges and arbitrators, was also noticeably repetitive at 
certain points, since judges and arbitrators had been addressed in the second chapter. 
Additionally, El-Awa’s research conclusion is a little disappointing. The author 
takes the reader through a multi-chapter journey and builds up towards a conclusion that 
comes abruptly and, unfortunately, may leave readers with unanswered questions. El-Awa 
spent many pages discussing topics such as the judiciary and Public Trial law but then 
disposed of those avenues quickly. Also, El-Awa’s ultimate conclusion that confidentiality 
could be extended to arbitration because confidentiality is an upshot of privacy seemed to 
undermine the distinction between the two concepts, which El-Awa addressed multiple 
times. Upon finishing this book, the reader may feel slightly confused as to how El-Awa 
concluded as she did. More insight from the author may have helped to clarify her rationale 
and conclusion. Finally, the price of this book may be prohibitive for some readers (around 
$100 or more), so this book is not recommended to anyone looking to buy a “leisure read.”  
VI. CONCLUSION 
El-Awa’s work ultimately guides the reader through three substantive areas. First, 
El-Awa sought to determine whether confidentiality and privacy were mandatory 
obligations in arbitration and concluded that neither obligation stemmed from existing 
arbitration law.167 Next, El-Awa discussed the Public Trial rule and determined that the 
principles of that rule do not apply to arbitration.168 Finally, El-Awa looks to individuals’ 
rights, as granted through Egyptian law, and concludes that the basis of confidentiality in 
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arbitration stems from an overarching individual right to privacy.169 Though the clarity of 
some aspects of the book could be improved, those with a serious interest in international 
law and international arbitration would certainly benefit from reading this book.  
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